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1. INTRODUCTION – NATURE AND BEHAVIOUR OF BUSINESS ACTORS 
 
This paper builds upon the advancements in structural analysis (Wellman and Berkowitz, eds. 
1988), network analysis (Nohria & Eccles, eds. 1992, Knoke and Guilarte, 1994), and a range of 
economic and management strategy theories, that have discussed the behaviour of interlinked 
economic agents. 
 
Our definition for business networks is the following: 
 
Business Networks are sets of repetitive transactions based on structural and relational 
formations with dynamic boundaries that comprise of interconnected elements (actors, 
resources and activities). Networks accommodate the contradictory aims pursued by 
each actor, and facilitate joint activities and repetitive exchanges that have specific 
directionality and flow of information, commodities, heterogeneous resources, 
individual affection, commitment and trust between the network members. 
 
The literature on business networks usually refers to the companies as the main agents, inter-
connected into buyer-supplier chains. If we look at a supplier chain of a firm as a business 
network, we can see that while all partners are interested in completing the exchange (a common 
aim), all of them negotiate individual outcomes and try to maximise the benefits that this 
exchange brings to them (contradictory aims). Re-negotiation of benefits in a business network 
takes place almost at every transaction. The dynamics of connections between members depends 
usually on the activity of the core actors of the network, who dominate and control the 
negotiation process, and determine the ‘membership status’ of the peripheral members.  
 
While there is no doubt that behind each firm stands a management team, composed by 
professionals in their own field, the literature still is dominated by the economic theories of firm 
behaviour. Conceptually it has been difficult to integrate the economic theories with the 
behavioural theories of the firm. While the former deals with issues of corporate governance, 
structure of costs, efficiency and productivity, the latter is focused on the actual process of 
decision making, and the individuals involved - with their multiple goals and authority relations 
in an organisational structure (Simon, 1957, Cyert and March, 1963). Firms are not only 
economic agents capable of strategic positioning in the market, but also social entities capable of 
learning and adaptive behaviour in dynamic and complex situations.  
 
In general, the economic concepts usually address the similarities between network members and  
issues of ‘typical’ forms of behaviour. On the contrary, the managerial theories of the firm reveal 
motivational and structural characteristics of firms that generate individual and specific 
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behaviour. We believe the two approaches are complementary in an interdisciplinary framework 
for network analysis. In this paper we look at some of the leading theories in both fields, and 
discuss the behavioural principles promoted by each of them. This, we believe, will enhance 
business network analysis with new concepts and perspectives. 
 
It has been already admitted that the sociological theory after Weber has neglected the concept 
of the market and, therefore, it is not well-equipped to propose new conceptual framework for 
the analysis of firm’s behaviour. However, the management and strategy literature provides 
alternative perspectives that could be contrasted with the economic theories, developed within 
the transaction cost framework. 
 
Typically, the characteristics of network agents measured by network analysts are: centrality of 
one or more of the actors (in terms of their capacity to receive or send a disproportionate amount 
of relations with others), and direct vs. indirect contacts between the actors. The capacity of 
actors to connect to other actors through a number of steps demonstrates actors’ dependency on 
information and resources, and is measured usually by the distance.  
 
Subsequent concepts that derive from the measure of centrality are: the notion of an information 
broker (or actor with proportionately large number of incoming ties), and co-ordinator (an actor 
with proportionately large number of outgoing ties). It is important to mention that current 
theory does not generally discuss specific characteristics of the individual actors. The network 
members are assumed to have similar characteristics. However, it is self-evident that neither 
social networks, nor business networks comprise of equal members. The participation of 
individual member-firms in transactions and exchanges is specific, and is directly effected by the 
firm’s size, by its history, by its product range and diversification, the market share, or by the 
market penetration through distribution channels - all company specific characteristics.  
 
In this context, what is still an unexplored territory, is an assessment and comparison of the 
behaviour of different actors, including their motives, and their actions – what they actually do 
as being connected within a particular set of relations. The emphasis of our analysis is on firms’ 
behaviour in a competitive market environment, determined by socially connected managers. 
This implies that the behaviour of firms is a result of managerial decisions and choices, affected 
by social and economic factors. 
 
In the subsequent parts of the paper we examine various forms of behaviour of economic actors, 
connected in a value chain, or connected by market forces. All behavioural motives and actions 
are summarised in Fig. 1., where we present an abstract model of a heterogeneous business 
network. 
 
2. BEHAVIOUR IN BUSINESS NETWORKS 
 
The managerial theory of the firm launched with the work of Berle and Means (1932) on the 
issue of separation of ownership from control raises a number of issues. Among them are the 
questions of the motivational forces behind, and the control over a firm’s behaviour. It rejects the 
assumption of profit-maximisation as a driving force in the market place, and introduces the 
assumption of managerial self-interest (Seth and Thomas, 1994). The firm’s administrative 
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apparatus, or firm’s structure and hierarchy, become important factors, determining strategic 
decisions and economic transactions.  
 
Penrose (1959) sees the firm as a collection of productive resources, and that each firm possesses 
a distinctive set of competencies, specialised resources, skills, tangible and intangible assets 
(including brand-name recognition, reputation, and market share). These are resources that 
provide firms with a competitive advantage in the market place.  
 
However, firm’s competencies, specialised resources, tangible and intangible assets could 
become advantages only if they are efficiently employed by the firm’s managers. A large number 
of business cases demonstrate for example the importance of the abilities of company managers 
to lead a turnaround programme in order to position the firm better in continuously transforming 
market environment.  
 
Overall the management theory of the firm equals the behaviour of the firm with the strategic 
behaviour of the managers, even though the later is a means of the former. The implications for 
network analysis are that both managers and firms could be placed in the nodes of a network. 
Relationship between two nodes - firms or managers - could take the form of exchange of both 
tangible and intangible assets and resources - products, services, information, practices, 
knowledge, or experience. In this respect, for the purpose of a network analysis both firms and 
managers represent economic agents involved in transactions. However, within the concept of 
‘business network’ we envisage primarily relationships between firms that are formed through 
managerial decisions. 
 
• Accumulation of Heterogeneous Resources 
 
Considering the fact that all activities of economic actors involve  one form or another of 
resource allocation, distribution, and utilisation, it is important to look at the way firms deal with 
the resource issue. The resource-based view of the firm sees companies as a bundle of 
heterogeneous resources. These resources are treated as an outcome of exogenous influences 
from the environment, rather than as a result of a proactive strategic behaviour, conducted in a 
dynamic environment – the latter being dominated by stochastic processes and various 
constraints and opportunities (Seth and Thomas, 1994). This economic view of the firm can 
explain a current level of resources, but can not address issues of changes in the level of 
resource.  
 
Once we focus on the proactive behaviour of the firm, ruled by managerial utility and managerial 
self-interest (Mintzberg, 1983), the irrational component of the firm’s decision making process 
becomes a dominant factor. The accumulation of heterogeneous resources becomes a selective 
and strategic process, and demonstrates the way management sees the future of the company. 
Managerial vision becomes a significant factor.  
 
It is difficult to establish the causality between accumulated resources and assets, and specific 
strategic decisions. Both are simultaneously constraints and opportunities for each other. 
Managers make decisions which they see as appropriate to the current access to resources. On 
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the other hand, managers proactively seek and accumulate resources in order to extend the scope 
for their business decisions. 
 
Each member of a business network is capable of accumulation of resources, or what we would 
call, network capital1 - heterogeneous resources, committed by each actor, and designated for  
business activities and transactions within the business network. The accumulation of network 
capital is driven by the primary objective of each firm to re-locate and re-position itself in the 
network, which will extend its ability to exercise more control over future contracts and 
transactions with buyers and suppliers. 
 
Managerial strategies related to resource accumulation will have a significant impact on the level 
of cohesion and competition within the network, on the structure and configuration of 
relationships, and on the reciprocity of exchanges between members. The exogenous influences 
on firm’s behaviour will come from the set of ties, which the firm has established along the value 
chain of suppliers and buyers, and also from the broader business environment of competitors, 
regulators, and related markets. 
 
Inspite of its limitations, the resource-based theory of the firm explains the inequality between 
network members in terms of accumulated resources, and the directionality of their efforts to 
maintain and establish new ties in order to increase the resource level. 
 
• Minimising Costs and Maximising Benefits 
 
The inequality between network members derives also from their different capabilities to 
manage their costs. This line of argument is particularly well developed within the transaction 
cost theory (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1985). The cost structure of the economic 
agents is affected by their assets specificity, by the uncertainty, and the frequency of 
transactions. Their behaviour therefore, aimed at the reduction of transaction costs, is expected to 
include efforts to increase the more general use of their assets, to control the uncertainty of their 
market transactions, and to increase the frequency (or volume) of transactions. 
 
Minimisation of costs, therefore, is based on specific business activities, such as: diversifying 
assets and capabilities, securing long-term contracts, and making commitments to buyers and 
suppliers. These activities include among others the development of hierarchical relations within 
and between the interconnected economic actors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1The term ‘capital’ is used by Burt (1992) who refers to three types of capital - financial capital (cash, bank 
reserves, or lines of credit), human capital (abilities, experience, formal education and training), and social capital 
(contacts and relations). We introduce the term network capital as a concept that builds upon the relational content 
of social capital, and includes the resources, engaged in network links. A business network is constructed not only 
by links and relationships between economic agents, but also by contracts and agreements between them, that tied-
up specific resources, committed by each member, and therefore develop dependencies and liabilities between the 
contracting parties. 
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• Maximising Payoffs 
 
In addition to the motives for accumulation of resources and minimisation of costs, economic 
agents are driven by motives for maximisation of benefits, compared with other known to them 
actors. Another theory, which aims to analyse the underlying motives of strategic behaviour in a 
competitive environment under the conditions of limited access to information and resources, is 
the non-co-operative game theory. According to the leading theorists in this field, the players 
aim at maximising their payoffs in a wider sense, rather than maximising profits. Their market 
strategy, is determined by the market structure. The players continuously create for themselves 
more favourable market position, from which they have increased chances of ‘outdoing their 
adversaries’, knowing that the adversaries are trying to do the same (Encaoua et al., 1986, Dixit 
and Nalebuff, 1991, Seth and Thomas, 1994). 
 
The decisions that firms make in this game scenario depend on the available information and 
resources. Examples of non-co-operative strategies by economic agents, according to Shapiro’s 
survey, are a number of strategic actions in already concentrated industries. These typically 
include: investment in physical capital, investment in intangible assets, strategic control of 
information, and horizontal mergers (Shapiro, 1989).  
 
Concentrated industries usually are characterised by few players, engaged in direct competition. 
In this context, firms are motivated to extend their capacity through investment in physical 
assets; to move forward their competitive edge through investment in intangible assets; to 
maintain their leading position by strategic control of information; and to reduce competition 
through horizontal mergers. All these manoeuvres are perceived by firms as re-positioning and 
maximising the payoffs from the current position. 
 
Non-co-operative game theory describes well the process of repositioning in a competitive 
environment. It highlights how temporary is any description of the economic agents as engaged 
in relationships within their network of buyers and suppliers. This analysis also calls for a 
change of the traditional view of business networks as ego-centred sets of firms, connected to 
their buyers and suppliers. The behaviour of network members is very much affected by the 
activities of  their competitors. It may also include connecting to competitors through mergers, 
acquisitions, and co-operative alliances. We discuss further in the paper more details of co-
operative strategies, applied by inter-connected actors. 
 
In the context of industrial analysis and network analysis we also could draw a parallel between 
behaviour of firms in ‘concentrated industries’ and in networks with high density. Expected 
behaviour by the network members will be one of personal investment in new links and contract 
relations, with attempts to build asymmetries through control of information, or through intra-
network re-groupings.  
 
In their competition for more favourable position in the network, actors tend to increase 
asymmetries in their relations, and to create inequalities that may lead to potential 
confrontational links. This suggests a new research agenda for network analysis focused on the 
confrontational potential of any form of alliance between interrelated network members. 
 
 6
• Bargaining and Negotiating Contracts 
 
We would like to stress that the non-co-operative game theory projects motives and behaviour of 
actors entirely dis-engaged from contracts and relationships with others. The agency theory of 
the firm on the contrary, looks at the company as governed by a set of contractual relations. The 
firm is only a single actor, or an agent engaged in bi-lateral and multi-lateral contracts. The 
bargaining and the political nature of these contracts is assumed. Their content is influenced by 
the external environment, and by the inter-firm relations with other individuals or organisations. 
So, the behaviour of the firm in the market place depends on its contractual relations with other 
economic actors, which are continuously re-negotiated.  
 
The agency theory highlights that network ties are not fixed, but are dynamic. It also reveals the 
political nature of network members, involved in continuous negotiations of contracts. This 
influences our perception of the nature of network ties between different firms, as being one of 
balanced competition and co-operation. The balance is determined by the existing contracts 
between economic agents, and by the abilities of some members to change contracts 
unilaterally2.  
 
The implications for network analysis are that more attention needs to be paid to: the structural 
and relational asymmetries (like direct vs. indirect contacts); to the number and the type of 
incoming vs. outgoing relations; to the reciprocity in existing relations; the centrality and 
betweenness of contacts; and the capacity to produce dependencies within the network through 
non-redundant ties. Relational asymmetries are particularly evident in contracts where exchange 
of resources and payments is fixed, allowing each firm to calculate individually the added value 
from a contract.  
 
• Co-operating for a Final Outcome 
 
The co-operation between the contracting parties in a market environment is assumed by most of 
the economic theories in order for a transaction to take place. The stakeholders’ theory assumes 
also co-operation within a network of agents with vested interests in the final outcome. The 
interests of these agents include an intent to extend the co-operative action. However, their 
interests are also contradictory (like for example the tensions between buyers and sellers, 
managers and shareholders). Each stakeholder’s group aims at maximising its benefits, even if it 
is at the disadvantage of the others. In this respect, the difference between the non-co-operative 
game theory and the stakeholders’ theory is that the latter assumes higher co-operation in a 
competitive environment. 
 
The dynamics of the relationships between different stakeholders highlight further the need for 
more attention to network processes rather than structure. The research on actors’ interests leads 
to a focus on the dynamics of ties and relations, rather than their structural configuration. 
Appropriate methodologies for relational analysis are usually based on qualitative data. The 
                                                          
2All networks are characterised by certain asymmetries when some members in some positions, particularly those 
with high number of non-redundant contacts (Burt, 1992), are able to control the network processes. Dominant 
stakeholders may decide to honour contracts, or as all examples of market failures show, they could change terms of 
contracts unilaterally and without negotiations. 
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work by Chwe (1996) on communication and co-ordination in social networks is a serious 
attempt to quantify individual strategies through measurement of individual ‘thresholds’ of 
reaction.  
 
According to Chwe, each individual member has a specific ‘threshold’ of reaction to an event, or 
to other members’ behaviour. This threshold evolves over time. It is highly dependent on the 
individual preferences and on the knowledge of the preferences of the ‘other’ participants. If 
one has limited knowledge of the preferences of the others, it is difficult to choose a mode of 
action and to estimate appropriateness. The assumption is that when motives and stimulus are 
below the threshold, and the preferences are high and no positive outcomes are expected, agents 
don’t act. The behaviour of network members is therefore an outcome of the choices of 
individual agents to act accordingly to their preferred outcomes, and the preferences of the 
‘others’. 
 
The stakeholders’ theory advocates that network members have a mutual interest to participate in 
the network activities. However, it does not suggest by any means that all agents are equally 
positioned, and that they have complementary interests. On the contrary, the complementarity 
comes through communication and co-ordination of the joint activities, and the increased 
awareness of the preferences of the ‘other’ stakeholders. We may conclude that the stakeholders 
theory does not advocate that network members have a co-operative nature, but through their 
joint activities they are capable to communicate their interests and preferences, and to co-
ordinate co-operative actions. 
 
• Forming Coalitions 
 
Insights on managerial choices could be found in the work on power in organisations by 
Mintzberg (1983) and Pfeffer (1992), and the work on interlocking corporate directorates by 
Scott and Burt (Burt, 1979, Scott, 1987). Mintzberg’s definition of power as ‘the capacity to 
effect (or affect) organisational outcomes’ (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 4) suggests a number of 
implications.  
 
One of them is that the effectiveness of a group effort will be different from the effectiveness of 
an individual effort, and therefore will have different impact on the organisational outcomes. So, 
the ‘capacity’ (i.e. the power) will differ by the strength and the direction of one’s effort in 
relation to the efforts of the other actors in an organisation. An example will be a conflict 
situation between two actors within the same organisation, who have different objectives or 
contradictory views of how to act in pursuing an aim already agreed upon. If there is a 
disagreement between these actors, the directions of their efforts will differ, and therefore a 
substantial amount of energy will be wasted by both of them to neutralise the effect from the 
rival action of the other.  
 
This is a good example why managers form coalitions in order to achieve certain objectives in 
certain ways. These coalitions usually aim to ensure that all participants share similar objectives 
and similar views on how to achieve these objectives. A collective strategy will obviously 
improve the efficiency of an action in organisational settings. Forming a coalition in network 
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analysis is known as formation of cliques (or ‘action sets’ – Knoke, 1994), and is seen as having 
a negative impact on the equality of distribution of information and resources. 
 
In reference to network analysis, the example above of a conflict situation shows a network with 
low cohesion or high competition between two different actors. We may expect that in low 
cohesion networks actors would have conflicting strategies and interests, and formal contract and 
relations between them would be unstable. Actors will seek to secure the desirable outcomes 
through building wider coalitions. 
 
We have to stress that network members engaged in a coalition, or an action set, do not act 
necessarily in a coherent way. There might be a discrepancy between the desirable outcomes, 
perceived by each actor, or the extent to which goals and strategies are shared. 
 
If the network members have conflicting objectives and intentions, they will interpret the link in 
a different way, seeing different opportunities for themselves, and creating asymmetries within 
the action set in order to achieve their own objectives. Whether they are able to do so will 
depend on their position within the network structure and their capacity to generate support for 
their plans through coalitions. A major question is what factors increase cohesion in a network, 
and how trust, loyalty, and commitment relate to the diversity of goals of the members.  
 
• Preferences, Decision Making, and Goal Setting 
 
Mintzberg’s discussion on preferences and goal setting is quite adversarial, and suggests that 
members of an organisation (assumed as an intra-organisational network of individuals) are 
involved in a complex process of negotiation over organisational objectives. As an introduction 
to his theory of power in organisations, Mintzberg refers to the work by Cyert and March (1963) 
on coalitions to discuss the fact that the establishment of organisation’s goals is far from a 
rational process. All outside and inside participants in the decision making process are 
continuously bargaining and negotiating with each other the inducements in return for 
contributions. Therefore the determination of the outcomes (or the organisational goals) is a 
result of the dynamics of ‘shifting participants, shifting needs, shifting power within the 
coalition’ (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 16).  
 
To establish further the intra-organisational dynamics, Mintzberg (1983) refers also to the work 
by Petro Georgiou (1973), that looks at the concept of the organisation as an arbitrary defined 
focus of interests. Georgiou views the internal and the external participants in organisational 
goal setting as a strategic force in the organisation, whose behaviour is determined by the 
rewards they pursue. The process of decision making and goal setting is also seen as a market 
exchange of incentives. In this view the market is seen as a fundamental process, which is part of 
the functioning of the organisational hierarchy. 
 
This analysis translated into the network discourse means that in a network there is an ongoing 
process of re-distribution of resources and information which aims to shift the balance of power 
and influence. This adversarial tendency between network members could be outwit in two 
ways: either by enhancing control and dependency (and creating hierarchy of subordination in a 
network), or by developing trust and commitment to the existing contracts and relations. This 
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suggests that there are two main types of networks - self-regulating (through norms, rules, 
loyalty, commitment and trust) and regulated (either internally by powerful members, or 
externally through hierarchies).  
 
It is important to mention that the two types are ideal and form a scale that may accommodate all 
practical cases of business networks. In regulated networks there are rules and norms that govern 
the contract relations, while the goal-setting could still be spontaneous process, lead by the 
network entrepreneours. 
 
• Self-co-ordination vs. Co-ordination Agency 
 
Business and management networks exist in a broader environment, which usually provides a set 
of rules, and regulations that affect the network performance and operations. Some networks in 
their evolution achieve high level of cohesion based on trust and commitment by all members to 
prolong the existing relations. However, we may expect that the majority of networks envisage a 
certain level of asymmetry which is generated by larger firms, by more experienced managers, or 
by charismatic leaders. These network leaders are expected to have a major impact on the 
structure of the entire net, on the rules and regulations for performance, and on the specific 
distribution of inducements, incentives and profits. 
 
Mintzberg (1983) refers back to a 1952 paper by Papandreou about the existence of multiple 
objectives coming from the internal and the external environment, passing through a peak co-
ordinator that reconciles these goals into a single preference function. The concept of a peak co-
ordinator could be liased with the concept of a co-ordinating agency in a network, or actors with 
high concentration of non-redundant contacts who occupy positions of high centrality, and are 
located close to structural holes (Burt, 1992, Brass, 1992). The difficulty with a network analysis 
is to identify these co-ordinating agents that set communication and decision priorities for the 
entire net.  
 
Usually it is assumed that networks imply a mechanism of self-co-ordination and self-
organisation among de-centralised parts (or agents), in a process of information exchange. 
However, network analysis has not found yet significant evidence for self-co-ordination as a 
widely implied mechanism in the real business world, but rather as an exception. On the 
contrary, the dynamics of relations between different agents suggest that business network 
structures transform into hierarchies under certain conditions (i.e. in joint ventures, acquisitions, 
horizontal and vertical integrations), or represent equally competitive environments, such as 
markets (i.e. in the case of subcontracting, outsourcing, and alternative suppliers). 
 
• Entrepreneurship – Initiation of New Transactions and Contacts 
 
Leading actors in this process are those that initiate transactions and new relationships, called by 
Burt ‘network entrepreneurs’. They are the first to identify a new business opportunity, and to 
pursue the realisation of that opportunity through establishing new relationships (see Burt, 
1992). This means that usually some members of the network have at least the time advantage in 
negotiating formal contracts that substantiate a relationship between partners.  
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Entrepreneurs who establish links with other agents for exchange of goods and services, 
information and ideas, affects, or influence (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun, 1979, p. 508) 
usually build wide networks. It is expected that these entrepreneurs will have high level of 
centrality in the network, and will have initially high level of control over decisions in that 
network. The evolution of the network will depend to a great extent on the vision of these 
‘network designers’ and their ability to lead the network processes. The network processes 
include the exchange of incentives between actors through setting objectives with desirable 
outcomes, and through exchange of rewards. 
 
• Acquiring and Maintaining Power in Business Networks 
 
Another perspective on the structure of business networks comes from the strategy literature, and 
particularly the work by Porter on value chains. Porter’s framework deals with the issues of 
assets creation, or relocation and concentration of resources within the value chain of a company 
and the wider value system3. According to Porter, organisational power is measured through the 
‘sustainability of profits against bargaining (by suppliers and buyers), and against direct and 
indirect competition’ (by existing competitors, new entrants and substitutes of products and 
services) (Porter, 1991, p. 100).  
 
The sustainability of profits by businesses is achieved through a range of strategic activities 
within the firm’s value chain and within the overall value system. A firm gains power and 
strengthens its position in the value system by creating assets external to it, which could be 
tangible (such as contracts) and intangible (such as brand images, relationships with customers 
and network ties) (Porter, 1991).  
 
However, Porter makes it perfectly clear that firm’s advancement to a favourable position is 
achieved through the initial conditions (including pre-existing reputation, skills, routine 
practices), through the managerial choices of which activities to perform, and through the 
supporting investments in assets and skills (or allocation of resources within the value chain). 
Here, the value chain is part of the value system that is understood as the network of suppliers 
and buyers, maintained by each company. 
 
From this perspective, it is important to note that firms as members of a network are 
continuously involved in value creation in order to maintain their position on the market (i.e. in 
the value system), or to advance their position. Advancement will mean higher bargaining power 
against suppliers and buyers, and more stable position against competitors. The very notion of 
the market suggests a certain level of competition, and therefore an orientation of all firms in the 
business network to pursue individual interests. On the contrary, an attempt for pursuing 
collective interests and objectives will be regarded as an attempt to avoid market pressures and 
uncertainty.  
 
                                                          
3According to Porter (1985) the ‘value system’ comprises of: a) upstream value chain of suppliers; b) the firm’s 
value chain; c) downstream value chains of distribution channels and end-users. The ‘value chain’ of the firm itself 
comprises of the firm’s infrastructure, human resource management, technology development, procurement, 
inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing, sales, and services. 
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Managerial choices in this respect will depend not only on how managers perceive the interest of 
their company, but also how they perceive their partners in the value chain. Long-term 
commitment to a partnership is something that has to be nurtured through mutual understanding, 
and to be enhanced through personal relationships.  
 
• Control and Manipulation of the External and the Internal Environment 
 
A corresponding framework in organisation and management theory is Robbins’s (1990) 
environmental management, which includes internal and external strategies applied by firms and 
managers. The internal strategies, according to the author, are environmental scanning (to 
analyse the position of stakeholders, government, competitors, trade unions), domain choice (or 
targeting a specific market niche), recruitment (or personnel selection and accumulation of 
human capital), geographic dispersion (targeting geographically disconnected markets to tackle 
political risk), buffering (flexibility in contracts to ensure alternative suppliers and absorption of 
outputs), smoothing (levelling out fluctuations in the market), rationing (re-location of resources 
according to priorities and situations) (Robbins, 1990).  
 
The external strategies include: advertising (to manipulate the demand and the price sensitivity 
of customers), coopting (to absorb individuals that otherwise may threaten the firm’s operations - 
e.g. through interlocking directorates), lobbying (to influence regulatory bodies in order to 
achieve favourable outcomes from government policy and legislation), sub-contracting (to 
externalise costs and to protect changes in quantity and price), coalescing (to form mergers and 
joint ventures for lessening inter-organisational competition and dependency) (Robbins, 1990, 
pp. 358-375).   
 
All internal and external strategies by their nature represent behaviour oriented towards the 
alteration or the maintenance of a particular network position and specific network relationships 
in which the firm is involved. The ‘environmental scanning’ in practice is gathering information 
about the network. ‘Domain choice’ is behaviour oriented towards preferential location in the 
production network and the market segment. ‘Recruitment’ and ‘geographic dispersion’ are 
forms of behaviour that enhance firm’s capacity to control its performance and network ties. It is 
also an investment in intangible assets in order to gain a comparative advantage in relation to 
other firms. ‘Buffering’, ‘smoothing’ and ‘rationing’ are all directed towards absorbing and 
modulating pressures on the entrance and the exit of the firm in order to protect existing business 
relations.  
 
The external strategies are also oriented towards repositioning in the market place and enhancing 
certain relationships with customers (through ‘advertising’), with shareholders, banks, 
governments or competitors (through ‘coopting’ and ‘lobbying’), and with partner businesses 
(through ‘sub-contracting’ and coalescing’). 
 
All these examples of environmental management strategies highlight the fact that network 
members are not indifferent in relation to the network configuration, but are active participants 
that are able to transform and manipulate network ties. 
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The review of the economic and management theories of the firm suggests that the research 
agenda on networks could be enlarged beyond the structuralist approach. The behaviour of the 
network members is equally important as the structure of relations, and requires an equal 
attention by network analysts. 
 
• Mimicry and Normative Compliance in Business Networks 
 
The managerial practices of manipulating their external and internal environment mentioned 
above, are common for many businesses. This is supported also by the institutionalisation 
theory, which puts emphasis on the coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphism among 
business organisations (Di Magio and Powel, 1983). However, the management and strategy 
theories extend the notion of organisational changes, as due mainly to environmental pressures, 
and introduce an alternative view of the firm.  
 
On one side, environmental management practices show abilities of the organisations to affect 
their environment in a strategic manner, rather than responding to it. On the other side, 
institutionalisation theory emphasises the reactive behaviour of business organisations in 
compliance with normative pressures from the state, or mimicry towards established benchmarks 
by industry leaders. This demonstrates that there are theoretical grounds to expect both 
compliant and manipulative behaviour in business networks. The choice will reside with the 
managers of the firm, following their subjective evaluation of individual business situations. 
 
Fig 2. visualises some of the key types of strategic behaviour within a business network, that 
derive from our discussion of the strategy and management literature. These are: bargaining and 
negotiation between linked actors, repositioning of the members, maximising profits and 
payoffs, minimising costs, investment in assets, capabilities and new relations, building strategic 
capabilities, accumulation of heterogeneous resources, manipulation of the external and the 
internal environment (including, for example, market demand, cost-effectiveness, product 
quality, etc.), decision making and goal setting, mimicry and compliance, co-operation, co-
ordination, forming coalitions, entrepreneurship, initiation of contracts, acquiring and 
maintaining power..  
 
This abstract model represents also a variety of relationships between network members: for 
example ,competition between A and A2 for contracts with C; different relationships with the 
environment maintained by A and C (where C has an incoming link, while A has both incoming 
and outgoing ties); different types of centrality between B and C (based of incoming vs. outgoing 
relationships); different incoming ties which B receives from C and D (symbolising variations in 
quantity of exchanges resources); different directionality of links between B-C and B-A. 
Particularly interesting is the relationship between C and D, which symbolises a multi-
dimensional link that includes a long-term open-ended contract for joint activities, mutual 
payment links, and two directional exchanges of resources. The boundaries of this abstract 
business network are loose as it involves the potential of continuous changes of buyers and 
suppliers, incorporating new members and terminating contracts and exchanges with old ones. 
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Fig. 1.: Network Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
3. THE CONTENT OF RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS NETWORKS 
 
One of the fundamental barriers to network analysis is the duality of the nature of business 
networks - being simultaneously social and economic structures as well as dynamic processes of 
transactions between firms. The structuralist paradigm attempts to define basic assumptions that 
explain how network members are linked together and how these ties facilitate exchange of 
resources of any kind. However, this analysis is of limited value to practising managers who 
need not only to construct relations in the real business world, but also to fill these relations with 
content. Pro-active behaviour in a business network requires understanding of the behaviour of 
the other network members, their motives and preferences. 
 
Analysis of the content of network relations requires much more holistic approach (Buckley and 
Chapman, 1996). As discussed in this paper, the content of a relation is determined by the two 
partners involved in it. Both actors usually define their individual preferences and exchange 
information about their intentions. The contract between them evolves as a negotiated strategy 
for mutual co-operation. The content of the relation therefore includes: a) the individual 
intentions of the partners, b) the negotiated strategy between them, and c) the exchange of 
information and resources, or the transaction itself. This complexity requires also more in-depth 
analysis of the entire set of relations of each partner, rather than merely mapping existing 
structural links. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The existing research on networks puts emphasis on three aspects - the ‘nodes’, identified as the 
actors, the structure of ties, and the relations themselves measured mainly through directionality 
and reciprocity.  
 
One of the advancements made by the structural analysis is to recognise the embeddedness of 
market transactions in the structure of social relations. However, the practical consequences of 
that fact remain hidden in implicit assumptions about network ties, relations and attitudes of the 
actors. The recognition of power and dependency in social networks has driven structural 
analysts to study the effect of different structural configurations. The fact that relations between 
network members generate specific network dynamics has been largely ignored. It is this 
dynamics that is of primary interest in some managerial theories that deal with issues of actor’s 
choices and strategies. These are the conceptual frameworks of Mintzberg (1983) on intra- and 
inter-organisational power relations, and Porter’s theory of competitive advantage built by 
organisations through extending their control over the value chain and the value system (Porter, 
1991). 
 
The economic theories discussed in this paper, aim to analyse company behaviour, and are a 
valuable source for new research concepts and frameworks that could be used in network 
analysis. The resource-based view of the firm gives another perspective on the process of 
accumulation and distribution of resources. Issues of network cohesion are in direct 
contradiction with the practice of unequal concentration of resources within the net. Reciprocity 
of exchanges could exist only between equally resourced partners. Managerial strategies to 
accumulate resources vital for their firms will continuously increase inequality in a network, 
unless all managers adopt a completely new principle of partnership simultaneously.  
 
The non-co-operative game theory enhances the view of the adversarial nature of network 
members. Co-operation vs. confrontation requires not only negotiations at the level of individual 
strategies, but much higher level of co-ordination - either based on moral principles of trust, 
loyalty and commitment, or facilitated by a co-ordinating agency (internal or external to the 
network).  
 
The agency theory brings more insights into the formal and informal contracts that facilitate 
exchanges between partners in a network. The stakeholders’ theory takes a step further towards 
recognition of mutual interests beyond contradictory objectives. However, the emphasis is still 
on the decision making process that takes place in a network and the subordination of decisions, 
according to shared goals and individual interests.  
 
The managerial theory of the firm puts emphasis on the variety of competencies, specialised 
resources and assets that each firm has in principle, and the tendency of the firm to develop 
further a unique character in order to acquire a strategic advantage. All these factors will serve to 
increase inequality in a network, which will raise the opportunity for development of co-
ordination centres. This fact diminishes all discourse of the co-operative nature of network 
relations and the implied self-co-ordinating mechanism.  
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The principle of self-co-ordination is also undermined by a series of research in the strategy and 
management field, such as: the concentration and distribution of power within a network (in the 
context of the work by Mintzberg (1983), Scott (1987), Pfeffer (1992), and Burt (1992); the issue 
of directionality of efforts and shared objectives by network members (Burt, 1979, Mintzberg, 
1983, Scott, 1987); the notion of a ‘peak co-ordinator in a network (Papandreou, 1952, 
Mintzberg, 1983); the negotiations of rewards in return for contributions between network 
members (Cyert and March, 1963); the exchange of incentives along with exchange of resources 
(Georgiou, 1973); strategic repositioning in a network through asset creation and an increase of 
the bargaining power of the actor, and through establishment of horizontal and vertical 
‘partnerships’ across the value chain (Porter, 1991). 
 
A detailed analysis of the individual characteristics of the network members would contribute 
significantly to an explanation of the specific distribution and concentration of resources. There 
is also very little work done on the self-co-ordination and self-regulation mechanisms within 
network structures. In terms of intra-organisational dynamics, a synthesis is required between 
principles that derive from social psychology and organisational behaviour theory, and from the 
economic theory.  
 
Further research into the domain of relational dynamics in a network will not only enhance the 
value of previous research, but will allow more practical use of the findings. More practical 
research also will imply different set of research questions. For example: What types of strategic 
networks exist at national and international level? How large firms and holding companies 
transform their dependencies within the value-chain into advantages (like i.e. economies of 
scale)? How new business networks get established and what is the effect of new weak ties on 
the performance and restructuring of a network? What is the balance between high flexibility in 
contracts and more stable co-operative alignments in terms of effective network dynamics? Why 
some firms are not able to transform their network relations and to develop new business 
linkages? What is the effect of inter- and intra-industry processes on company networks? How 
membership in professional and political networks by managers or other stakeholders affects 
company performance? How risk and uncertainty of the business environment affect network 
cohesion and structure? 
 
Within the same accord of practical application of network theory Lester (1992) suggests that the 
future of management lies in a dynamic information exchange, in decentralised decision making, 
in boundaryles organisations with emphasis on self-organisation of work, and personal 
relationships. This description resembles the concept of a network as an alternative form of 
organisation of economic activities. 
 
Finally, we would like to stress that network theory is very far from consolidation. However, it 
offers a unique opportunity for an interdisciplinary endeavour to integrate knowledge from 
different social sciences, and to extend our understanding of the behaviour of interlinked firms as 
economic and social entities. 
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